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## **Sudan Law Reform Advocacy Briefing**

**October 2013**

Welcome to the second issue of the Sudan Law Reform Advocacy Briefing.<sup>1</sup> This Briefing will be published quarterly to highlight and reflect on development and issues critical to the promotion and protection of human rights in Sudan. Its aim is to inform and engage those working on, and interested in, law reform and human rights in Sudan. The present issue focuses on immunities for officials, which has been a matter of long-standing concern. It provides an analysis of applicable standards, in response to announcements by Sudan's Ministry of Justice that it plans to undertake a review of Sudan's immunities laws.

The issue also contains a list of reports recently published by international and regional organisations, NGOs and others.

Yours,

Lutz Oette

For further information, please visit our website at [www.pclrs.org/](http://www.pclrs.org/)  
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<sup>1</sup> The Advocacy Briefings are available online at: <http://www.pclrs.org/english/updates>.

# I. Reforming Sudan's laws on immunities

## 1. Reviewing Sudan's immunity laws

The prevalence of torture and other serious violations of human rights in Sudan has been a long-standing concern. Impunity for these violations is an important factor that contributes to the lack of their effective prevention. As highlighted by national actors as well as regional and international bodies, the granting of immunities for officials in Sudan's law is incompatible with the right to an effective remedy and the state's obligation to hold perpetrators of serious human rights violations to account and provide reparation to victims. Effectively, authorities are given the right to police themselves and the resulting lack of accountability perpetuates violations. The UN Human Rights Committee, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), various UN bodies, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur and others have called on Sudan to abolish immunities.<sup>2</sup> Sudan had the opportunity to do so in the Armed Forces Act of 2007, the Police Act of 2008, and the National Security Act of 2010, but has not done so. The Sudanese Constitutional Court has justified immunities by emphasising their conditional nature and the possibility of judicial review.<sup>3</sup> However, in practice, immunities have frequently led to impunity, including for serious human rights violations, and legal remedies are neither clear nor effective.<sup>4</sup> This was recognised in cases brought before the African Commission, such as *Osman Hummida, Amir Suliman and Monim El-Jak v. Sudan*,<sup>5</sup> and other cases documented by various bodies and organisations over the years.<sup>6</sup>

Against this background, it is welcome that Sudan's Ministry of Justice has reportedly announced a review of the current system amidst concerns over the adverse impact of immunities on the administration of justice.<sup>7</sup> Considering the limited progress made in legislative reform initiatives since 2005, any such review process should be participatory, transparent and expeditious. The review should be guided by Sudan's international human rights obligations as reflected in the Bill of Rights that forms an integral part of Sudan's Interim National Constitution, and be undertaken with a view to bringing Sudan's law in conformity with such obligations.

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<sup>2</sup> See e.g. *UN Human Rights Committee: Sudan*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3/CRP.1, 26 July 2007, para.9 (e) and *Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation*, Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), PSC/AHG/2 (CCVII), 29 October 2009, xix, para.25 (c) and (d); 56-63, paras.215-238; and 91, 92, para.336; African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, *Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the 4th and 5th Periodic Report of the Republic of Sudan*, Adopted at the 12th Extraordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights held from 29 July to 4 August 2012, Algiers, Algeria, para.66

<sup>3</sup> *Farouq Mohamed Ibrahim Al Nour v (1) Government of Sudan; (2) Legislative Body*; Final order by Justice Abdallah Aalmin Albashir President of the Constitutional Court, 6 November 2008.

<sup>4</sup> *UN Human Rights Committee: Sudan*, above note 1, para.9 and Tenth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, *Arbitrary arrest and detention committed by national security, military and police*, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

<sup>5</sup> *Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman (represented by FIDH and OMCT) v. Sudan*, Communication 379/09, Admissibility Decision, August 2012, see <http://www.fidh.org/African-Commission-on-Human-and-12386>.

<sup>6</sup> See REDRESS, African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies and Sudan Democracy First Group, *Comments to Sudan's 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Periodic Report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Article 5 of the African Charter: Prohibition of torture, cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment and treatment*, April 2012, at <http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1204%20Comments%20to%20Sudans%204th%20and%205th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> See Sudan Tribune, 'Senior Sudanese judicial official slams immunity granted to president and VP', 6 September 2013, at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47957>.

## 2. The nature and role of immunities in Sudan's legislation

This Briefing examines the compatibility of immunities with Sudan's international human rights obligations and the Bill of Rights, taking into consideration the practical application of immunities laws. It highlights that, in order for Sudan to meet its international obligations, immunities need to be removed for officials accused of serious human rights violations by repealing the provisions concerned. Such step would pave the way for Sudan's authorities to effectively investigate allegations of torture and other serious human rights violations past and present, and to prosecute those against whom sufficient evidence is available.

The granting of immunities in Sudan dates back to colonial times. At present, immunities for a range of officials is granted in particular in article 42(2) of the Armed Forces Act of 2007, article 45(1) of the Police Act of 2008, and article 52 of the National Security Act (NSA) of 2010.

By way of example, taking the most recently enacted provision on immunities, article 52 of the NSA provides that:

(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act and any right to claiming compensation against NSS [National Security Service], no civil or criminal procedures may be brought against a member or associate unless upon the approval of the Director. The Director shall give such approval whenever it appears that the subject of such accountability is not related to official business, provided that the trial of any staff or associates shall be before a closed criminal court, during their service or after its termination, with regards to acts committed by them.

(4) Subject to the provisions of Article (46) of this Act, and without prejudice to any right to claiming compensation against NSS, no civil or criminal procedures may be brought against a member as a result of an act associated with the official duty of the member unless upon the approval of the Director. The Director shall give such approval whenever it appears that the subject of such accountability is not related to NSS official business.

(6) Associates shall enjoy the same immunities provided for in this Article.

Article 52(3) of the NSA provides immunity for any acts done in an official capacity, covering criminal and civil proceedings. It does not specify which acts are "related to official business" and does not explicitly exempt torture or other serious violations from its remit. In practice, it is for the director of the National Security and Intelligence Services (NISS) to decide whether anything done while on duty falls within the scope of this article and whether immunities should be lifted. The Armed Forces Act and the Police Act follow a similar system of conditional immunities. The procedures for the lifting of immunity are not set out in legislation and have not been clarified in jurisprudence, as the Constitutional Court has upheld immunities legislation without providing further guidance.<sup>8</sup> There is, therefore:

- (i) neither judicial guidance nor publicly available guidelines for the criteria to be taken into account by the director of the forces concerned in determining whether or not to lift immunities;
- (ii) no timeframe for making any decision on the matter; and
- (iii) no clearly established procedure of judicial review, or a judicial standard of reviewing the exercise of discretion in such cases.

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<sup>8</sup> See *Farouq Mohamed Ibrahim Al Nour v (1) Government of Sudan; (2) Legislative Body*, above note 3.

### 3. Compatibility of immunities with Sudan's obligation to investigate and prosecute torture and other serious human rights violations

#### 3.1. Overview

Sudan is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) as well as a series of other treaties. The ICCPR and ACHPR recognise the right to an effective remedy and, as developed in the respective jurisprudence, the corresponding duty of States parties to investigate and prosecute allegations of torture. Such an obligation is also recognised in customary international law, and forms part of the international effort to prevent torture and other serious violations and to provide justice to victims of such violations.<sup>9</sup>

Investigations must be commenced immediately, i.e. without undue delay upon receipt of a complaint, unless it is manifestly ill-founded, or upon receiving credible information that acts of torture or ill-treatment have occurred.<sup>10</sup> The requirement of effective investigations imposes a duty on states to conduct an investigation that is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for any ill-treatment and permitting effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure.<sup>11</sup> Investigations may not be thwarted by legislation and/or practice.<sup>12</sup>

States have an obligation under international law to make torture a criminal offence subject to appropriate penalties<sup>13</sup> and to prosecute torture irrespective of where the crime was committed, the nationality of the victim or the alleged perpetrator (unless the suspect is extradited).<sup>14</sup> Although victims of torture do not have an objective right to the prosecution of alleged perpetrators they do have a right of access to justice: "As the [Human Rights] Committee has repeatedly held, the Covenant does not provide a right for individuals to require that the State criminally prosecute another person ... The Committee nevertheless considers that the State Party is under a duty to investigate thoroughly alleged violations of human rights... and to prosecute criminally, try and punish those held responsible for such violations. This duty applies a fortiori in cases in which the perpetrators of such violations have been identified."<sup>15</sup>

#### 3.2. Compatibility of Sudan's immunities laws with relevant international standards

##### 3.2.1. The requirement to investigate allegations of torture 'promptly'

The Attorney-General as the legal authority responsible for criminal investigations, upon receiving information that an act of torture has been committed, can only carry out a preliminary inquiry. The subsequent procedure of requesting approval from the head of the respective forces inevitably results in delays. Given the lack of any recognised and enforceable obligation on the part of the forces concerned to take any decision and the

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<sup>9</sup> See "III. Accountability for International Crimes", in Lutz Oette (ed.), *Criminal Law Reform and Transitional Justice: Human Rights Perspectives for Sudan* (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011), 155-60.

<sup>10</sup> UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment 20 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)*, 10 March 1992.

<sup>11</sup> See for example the judgment by the European Court of Human Rights, *Aksoy v. Turkey* (1997) 23 EHRR 553, para. 98.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, para.95.

<sup>13</sup> See UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment 20*, above note 10, paras.8 and 13, and ACHPR, *Guidelines for the Prohibition and Prevention of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa - Robben Island Guidelines*, paras.4-14.

<sup>14</sup> See Robben Island Guidelines, *ibid.*, and ; Articles 4-9 of the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

<sup>15</sup> *Case of Nydia Erika Bautista*, Communication No. 563/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 13 November 1995.

absence of any time frame for the making of such decision, delays are potentially open-ended, resulting in an indefinite delay. In practice, most cases are either terminated upon refusal to grant approval to open an investigation or are pending for months and years on end without any resolution of the matter. In both instances, full investigations are not commenced immediately and the system of prior approval is such that there is an inbuilt failure to meet the requirement of 'prompt' investigations.

### *3.2.2. The requirement to investigate allegations of torture 'impartially'*

While investigations are carried out under the supervision of the Attorney-General, the forces concerned play a crucial role in the investigatory process as their respective director is effectively tasked with determining whether or not a full investigation should take place. The law therefore puts the forces concerned in a position to block any investigations irrespective of available evidence and findings of the Attorney-General and the actual investigating bodies. The director of forces, such as the NISS, is not impartial because he,<sup>16</sup> as a superior of those suspected of having committed the crimes, not only has close links to the actual perpetrators, and may even be implicated in any offences committed, but also an institutional interest in preventing criminal proceedings of its members in order to preserve the integrity of the forces. There is a clear conflict of interest, which is compounded by the fact that the head of the forces concerned has seemingly unfettered discretion in making the decision on whether or not to grant approval. Moreover, as an executive body subordinate to the President of the Republic, the head of the forces concerned lack institutional independence. The institution is potentially subject to political considerations in its decision-making that may run counter to pursuing criminal proceedings against members of the forces concerned for alleged torture even where credible evidence is available.

### *3.2.3 The requirement to investigate allegations of torture 'effectively'*

There is neither a clear policy nor legal duty of the relevant authorities to investigate fully and effectively alleged acts of torture. Following a preliminary inquiry, the decision whether any investigative measures are to be taken rests with the head of the forces concerned. Pending approval, no measures can be taken, which, given the lengthy delays, enhances the likelihood that it results in the loss of evidence. With the passage of time, it is more difficult to collect accurate victim(s) and witness statements as well as the requisite medical evidence. Crucially, perpetrators of torture are given the opportunity to frustrate justice by destroying evidence, threatening victims and witnesses or escaping the grasp of the law altogether. In practice, the lack of approval frequently equates with a complete lack of investigations, let alone effective investigations. The end result is that no steps are taken to establish the facts of the crime or to establish the identity of the perpetrators, which in turn undermines the effectiveness of existing complaints procedures, as victims of torture have limited confidence in the ability of the system to take their complaints seriously and render justice.

### *3.2.4 The requirement to prosecute and punish those responsible for torture*

The conditional immunity granted to members of the forces concerned has de facto resulted in an almost complete lack of prosecutions of torture cases even where credible evidence was available<sup>17</sup> The immunity provisions in Sudanese laws therefore undermine and frustrate any prosecutions of officials.

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<sup>16</sup> Note that directors of the respective forces in Sudan have commonly been male.

<sup>17</sup> See for example cases referred to in note 3 above.

### 3.3. Findings

In its practical effects, the immunities laws resemble amnesty laws that make it impossible to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of torture or other serious human rights violations. It is well established that amnesties for serious human rights violations violate international standards, in particular states' obligations to investigate such violations.<sup>18</sup> Regional and international human rights bodies have recognised equally that immunities for serious violations contravene the duty to investigate.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 31, stated that:

...where public officials or State agents have committed violations of the Covenant rights referred to in this paragraph, the States Parties concerned may not relieve perpetrators from personal responsibility, as has occurred with certain amnesties (see General Comment 20 (44)) and prior legal immunities and indemnities. Furthermore, no official status justifies persons who may be accused of responsibility for such violations being held immune from legal responsibility...<sup>19</sup>

In its practice, the Human Rights Committee has repeatedly found immunity legislation to be incompatible with the right to an effective remedy and the concomitant duty to investigate and prosecute torture,<sup>20</sup> including in the case of Sudan:

It [the Human Rights Committee] is particularly concerned at the immunity provided for in Sudanese law and untransparent procedure for waiving immunity in the event of criminal proceedings against state agents.<sup>21</sup>

Other international and regional human rights bodies have shared these views in their jurisprudence and practice. The African Commission, in the Robben Island Guidelines, stated that:

In order to combat impunity States should:

Ensure that those responsible for acts of torture or ill-treatment are subject to legal process.  
Ensure that there is no immunity from prosecution for national suspected of torture...<sup>22</sup>

In its recent Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the 4th and 5th Periodic Report of the Republic of Sudan, the African Commission recommended that Sudan:

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<sup>18</sup> UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment 20 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)*, 10 March 1992, para.15: "The Committee has noted that some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be possible."

<sup>19</sup> UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, *The Nature of the General Legal Obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para.18.

<sup>20</sup> Concluding observations of the UN Human Rights Committee: India, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81, 4 August 1997, para.21: "The Committee notes with concern that criminal prosecutions or civil proceedings against members of the security and armed forces, acting under special powers, may not be commenced without the sanction of the central Government. This contributes to a climate of impunity and deprives people of remedies to which they may be entitled in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant."

<sup>21</sup> *UN Human Rights Committee: Sudan*, above note 1, para.9.

<sup>22</sup> Robben Island Guidelines, above note 13, para.16.

Repeal Article 52(3) of the National Security Act 2010 that provides members of the NISS and their associates with immunity from criminal and civil procedures.<sup>23</sup>

The Special Rapporteur on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment also stated that:

Legal provisions granting exemptions from criminal responsibility for torturers, such as amnesty laws (including laws in the name of national reconciliation or the consolidation of democracy and peace), indemnity laws, etc. should be abrogated.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. *Compatibility of immunities with Sudan's obligation to provide effective remedies and the right to reparation*

##### 4.1. Overview of applicable standards

The right to reparation for torture is recognised both as a matter of international treaty and customary international law. Under the ICCPR, states have an obligation to provide effective remedy for torture under Article 2 (3) in conjunction with Article 7 and 10. The African Commission has grounded such an obligation in Articles 1 and 5 of the ACHPR. In 2005, the UN General Assembly, in a landmark resolution, adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.<sup>25</sup>

The right to reparation for torture encompasses both the procedural right to an effective access to a court and the substantive right to reparation. As stated by the UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 31:

Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In addition to the explicit reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, the Committee considers that the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.<sup>26</sup>

In its jurisprudence, the African Commission has repeatedly held that states must provide remedies and reparation in case of a violation of the prohibition of torture, such as in the case of *Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan*.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, *Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the 4th and 5th Periodic Report of the Republic of Sudan*, Adopted at the 12th Extra-ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights held from 29 July to 4 August 2012, Algiers, Algeria, para.66.

<sup>24</sup> *General Set of Recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/68, 17 December 2002, para.26 (k).

<sup>25</sup> *Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law*, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005.

<sup>26</sup> UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, *The Nature of the General Legal Obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para.16.

<sup>27</sup> *Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan*, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. Nos. 222/98 and 229/99 (2003). The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, in its 2003 resolution Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial affirmed that everyone has the right to an effective remedy

#### 4.2. Compatibility of Sudan's immunities laws with relevant international standards

Immunities effectively bar victims of torture from claiming compensation and other forms of reparation for torture in the course of criminal proceedings and/or from filing an independent civil lawsuit for reparation against the individual official concerned. There is neither an established judicial procedure for reviewing the exercise of discretion by the director of the forces concerned nor any jurisprudence as to under what circumstances approval to proceed with legal proceedings should be granted. As a result, victims' access to court is subject to the unfettered discretion of the director, who, as the head of the very same forces alleged to be responsible for torture, lacks impartiality. In practice, there are few if any cases in which torture victims have been able to bring reparation claims against individual officers before courts because the head of the forces concerned routinely refuses to grant approval or takes no action, which effectively amounts to a refusal.

Immunities are without prejudice to any right to compensation against the state. While it is important that a victim can still sue the state under existing law, the provision fails to provide for an effective remedy. Firstly, individual perpetrators cannot be sued, thereby depriving the victim of specific forms of reparation connected to the personal responsibility of the perpetrator of torture. Secondly, the fact that there are routinely no criminal investigations puts a victim of torture in a disadvantageous position, as the evidence required to prove a claim will often not be available in the absence of any such criminal proceedings. Thirdly, the immunity accorded to the perpetrators of torture, in combination with a lack of victim and witness protection, makes victims who pursue their case vulnerable to threats and harassment. These factors combine in practice where there has been a marked absence of suits against the state. Even where they have an arguable claim, torture victims are routinely deprived of access to a court and have not received reparation, contrary to Sudan's obligations under international law.

### 5. Conclusion and recommendations

Any review of immunities in Sudan's legislation should be guided by Sudan's obligations under international treaty and customary international law, taking into consideration the jurisprudence and recommendations of relevant bodies. It should also examine the practical application of immunities laws. This includes: (i) the number of cases in which requests for immunities to be lifted were made; (ii) the length for which such requests were pending; (iii) number and nature of decisions made in relation to immunities, if any; and (iv) the outcome of any prosecutions brought, if any. To this end, the experiences and views of relevant actors, particularly complainants, should be sought and fully considered in determining the impact of immunities on the administration of justice.

As this Briefing demonstrates, immunities raise a series of concerns; for any review to be meaningful, it needs to take these concerns seriously and recommend measures that are both in line with Sudan's international obligations and result in actual changes to the effective administration of justice in Sudan.

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that includes: "(1) access to justice; (2) reparation for the harm suffered; (3) access to the factual information concerning the violations. (a) Every State has an obligation to ensure that: (1) any person whose rights have been violated, including by persons acting in an official capacity, has an effective remedy by a competent judicial body; (2) any person claiming a right to remedy shall have such a right determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities; (3) any remedy granted shall be enforced by competent authorities; (4) any state body against which a judicial order or other remedy has been granted shall comply fully with such an order or remedy. (b) The granting of amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability violates the right of victims to an effective remedy.

Partial reforms as reportedly suggested by the Ministry of Justice in workshops on the subject in Khartoum, 4-5 September 2013, will not be sufficient. Even if a system of immunities were to be put in place that specifies timeframes and is subject to judicial review, the fact that officials enjoy immunity, even if conditional, constitutes a barrier that is contrary to Sudan's duty to investigate allegations of torture and other serious human rights violations promptly and effectively. Further, there is a lack of judicial practice of independently and effectively reviewing executive decisions. Any reforms that would make the decision on whether or not to lift immunities subject to judicial review therefore carries the risk that immunities will continue to equate with impunity. If the review and subsequent reforms are to be genuine, they need to form an integral part of a policy and measures capable of combating torture and other serious human rights violations effectively. This applies particularly to ensuring accountability and justice to the victims of such violations.

## **II. Selected Documents (June to September 2013)**

### **United Nations**

#### **10 September 2013**

Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of Human Rights in Sudan, Mashood A. Baderin (Advanced Unedited Version, A/HRC/24/31)

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session24/Pages/ListReports.aspx>

#### **31 August 2013**

OCHA: Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot

[http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan\\_Snapshot\\_31\\_Aug\\_%202013\\_1.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan_Snapshot_31_Aug_%202013_1.pdf)

#### **30 July 2013**

Security Council Resolution (2113) Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2113\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2113(2013))

#### **29 July 2013**

Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2013/450)

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/450](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/450)

#### **12 July 2013**

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2013/420)

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/420](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/420)

#### **11 July 2013**

Security Council Resolution (2109) Sudan/South Sudan

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2109\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2109(2013))

#### **21 June 2013**

Positive developments in Sudan, but still major issues in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13478&LangID=E>

**June 2013**

Sudan: United Nations and Partners Work Plan 2013- Mid Year Review

[http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MYR\\_2013\\_Sudan\\_Workplan.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MYR_2013_Sudan_Workplan.pdf)

**Others****12 September 2013**

Letter (signed by twenty-four human rights organisations) to Permanent Representatives of African States to the UN Human Rights Council

<http://www.acjps.org/?p=1582>

**9 September 2013**

Letter (signed by twenty human rights organisations) to the Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States to the UN Human Rights Council Regarding the Renewal and Strengthening of the Special Procedure Mandate on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan

<http://www.acjps.org/?p=1508>

**29 August 2013**

Amnesty International's joint written statement to the 24th session of the UN Human Rights Council (9 September – 27 September 2013)

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/015/2013/en/b860c996-b094-47e5-8f41-3c2e74551c79/afr540152013en.pdf>

**August 2013**

Sudan Consortium: Human Rights Update: South Kordofan State, Sudan

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Consortium%20Update%20August%202013%20FINAL.pdf>

**18 June 2013**

Sudan's Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/204-sudans-spreading-conflict-ii-war-in-blue-nile.aspx>

**11 June 2013**

Sudan: 'We had no time to bury them': War crimes in Sudan's Blue Nile state

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/011/2013/en>